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ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has become
increasingly involved in preventing conﬂict and promoting
sustainable peace beyond its borders. The EU’s potential to
contribute to conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding is said to be
particularly promising given the wide range of instruments and
resources that can be mobilised under the EU’s external action.
Yet, the EU continues to face key four key challenges in this area:
(1) bridging the early warning-response gap; (2) improving
cooperation with other international partners in conﬂict
prevention and peacebuilding; (3) enhancing civil–military
coordination; and (4) ensuring local ownership. This article
introduces these four issues which frame the articles in this
Forum. By addressing these four challenges, this Forum sheds
light not only on the EU’s role and limitations as a peacebuilding
actor, but also on how other international actors might learn from
the EU’s engagement in conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding.
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Although the number of total armed conﬂicts has declined in recent years (Themnér &
Wallensteen, 2013), the consequences of ongoing conﬂicts remain devastating, as illus-
trated by the cases of Syria, Libya or Ukraine. Given the scale and the nature of
conﬂicts in the countries concerned and beyond their borders, it is no surprise that the
EU has sought to strengthen its capabilities to prevent and respond to conﬂicts. The
Lisbon Treaty provided the strongest mandate yet for the EU and its member states to
engage in conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding.1 According to the Treaties the EU
aims to “preserve peace, prevent conﬂicts and strengthen international security” (Article
21(2)). Building peace therefore constitutes one of the EU’s core values (Manners,
2002). The EU’s potential to contribute to conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding is said
to be particularly promising given the unique mix of instruments that the Union can
bring to these situations (Blockmans, Wouters, & Ruys, 2010).
Yet, despite the legal and rhetorical commitment to preventing and responding to
conﬂicts, the EU’s record so far leaves room for improvement (Juncos, 2013; Rodt,
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Ana E. Juncos A.E.Juncos@bristol.ac.uk
GLOBAL AFFAIRS
https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2018.1502619
2014). Scholarship on this issue has found a gap between rhetoric and practice, with the
EU expressing a commitment to, for instance, local ownership and fostering civil society
engagement, but failing to do so (Ejdus & Juncos, 2018; Pogodda, Richmond, Tocci, Mac
Ginty, & Vogel, 2014). Moreover, while the lack of political will has been at the heart of
some of the EU’s policy failures, inadequate or insuﬃcient capabilities continue to be a
structural problem aﬀecting EU peacebuilding (see Council of the EU, 2011). In other
words, the “capability-expectations gap” described by Hill (1993) more than two
decades ago continues to hinder the EU’s role in conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding,
in particular, when it comes to civilian capabilities (Juncos, forthcoming; Pirozzi,
Venturi, & Marrone, Forthcoming; Tardy, 2017). While current eﬀorts to strengthen
EU civilian crisis management, including the establishment of a Civilian Compact
(Council of the EU, 2017), are encouraging they will remain hollow unless the Member
States are willing to support them. This Forum aims to shed light on the potential, but
also the challenges the EU currently faces as a peacebuilding actor.
When it comes to the EU’s role in preventing and responding to external conﬂicts,
much of the literature has, and remains, focused on the development of Brussels-based
institutions, policies and procedures (Dijkstra, 2013; Smith, 2017). We know less,
however, of how EU conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding is implemented in practice.
Furthermore, the focus has predominantly been on the Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) (see Chivvis, 2010), rather than on other areas of EU external action. More-
over, not enough attention has been paid to the interactions between the CSDP and other
EU policies such as development or internal security policies. This is particularly impor-
tant given the renewed emphasis on an integrated approach to external action in the EU
Global Strategy (EUGS) (European Union, 2016).
The articles in this Forum seek to ﬁll some of these gaps by examining EU conﬂict pre-
vention and peacebuilding in action in particular key regions for the EU: the Western
Balkans and the Horn of Africa. The Western Balkans has been, and remains, a key
area of engagement for the EU since the dissolution of the Yugoslavian Federation in
the 1990s (Blockmans, 2007; Juncos, 2013). It has also become a testing ground for
CSDP capabilities and the EU’s integrated approach. The Horn of Africa has become a
focus of activity for the EU more recently, especially given the rise in maritime piracy
and terrorism in the region (Germond & Smith, 2009). By analysing and comparing the
EU’s role in these two regions, important insights into the development of EU capabilities
for conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding can be generated.
Last but not least, in order to understand the EU’s role in conﬂict prevention and peace-
building, it is necessary to place this issue in the wider context of international peacebuild-
ing and the key challenges that the international community faces in this area (see Paris &
Sisk, 2009). From this perspective, it is possible to identify four key challenges that still
aﬀect the EU’s practice. These four issues, which are then used to frame the articles in
this Forum, include the following: (1) bridging the early warning-response gap; (2) foster-
ing cooperation with other international partners; (3) enhancing civil–military coordi-
nation in conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding; and (4) how to ensure local ownership.
By addressing these four challenges, this Forum sheds light not only on the EU’s role
and limitations as a peacebuilding actor, but also on how other international actors
might learn from the EU’s engagement. In the remainder of this Introduction, we
provide a brief overview of how each of the articles in the Forum contribute to advancing
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our knowledge about how these challenges shape the EU’s role in conﬂict prevention and
peacebuilding.
Four key challenges in EU conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding
Challenge 1: bridging the gap between early warning and early response
Because of the harmful consequences of conﬂict, international actors have increasingly
focused on the early stages of a conﬂict with a view to prevent the outbreak, escalation or
recurrence of conﬂict. In his ﬁrst speech as UN Secretary General, António Guterres
(2017) claimed that the UN system had to become more eﬀective at preventing conﬂict
and sustaining peace. For its part, the EUGS also emphasizes the need to focus on prevention
or, as it calls it, “pre-emptive peacebuilding and diplomacy” (European Union, 2016, p. 29).
Over the past few years, the EU has invested in developing early warning indicators and capa-
bilities for monitoring and analysis to keep a close watch on the root causes of conﬂict. In an
institutional sense, these capabilities are located in the European External Action Service,
namely in the INTCEN (EU Intelligence and Situation Centre) and PRISM (“Prevention
of conﬂicts, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation”) divisions.
Despite policy consensus that prevention is always better than managing the conse-
quences of conﬂict (European Union, 2016, p. 29), failures continue to aﬀect international
responses to violent conﬂict. To a great extent, problems go back to the “warning-response
gap” identiﬁed by George and Holl (1997; see also Meyer, Otto, Brante, & Franco, 2010).
As summarized by the EUGS, “[e]arly warning is of little use unless it is followed by early
action” (European Union, 2016, p. 30). This Forum thus investigates how EU conﬂict pre-
vention capabilities could be strengthened in order to close that gap. In particular, the con-
tributions examine the following questions: are EU conﬂict prevention capabilities ﬁt for
purpose? How can these capabilities – to lead, engage, fund and cooperate with other
actors – be enhanced in order to narrow, or even close, the warning-response gap?
In their analysis, Pirozzi et al. (Forthcoming) show that despite the fact that Member
States have invested signiﬁcant resources in developing capabilities in the area of satellites
and drones, these are still not fully utilized when it comes to EU conﬂict prevention and
peacebuilding, especially in the area of civilian CSDP. To a great extent, the Member
States surveyed (France, Italy, Germany and Sweden) are still unaware of the potential of
new technologies for early warning and conﬂict analysis. Problems also extent to the area
of personnel, both in terms of training and recruitment. While member states remain com-
mitted to the EU’s goals in conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding, they are not always willing
to match those goals with the appropriate level of resources or with suitably trained person-
nel. This hinders the EU’s ability to eﬀectively respond to conﬂicts and crises.
For her part, Davis (Forthcoming) argues that the EU has extensive capabilities to
engage, fund, and coordinate and cooperate with third parties in preventing conﬂict.
However, Davis identiﬁes two key problems in relation to EU conﬂict prevention. First,
there remains a conceptual confusion among EU policy-makers who understand
conﬂict prevention both as a way-of-doing-things in relation to the outside world and
as a set of distinct activities (e.g. conﬂict analysis, early warning and mediation). Secondly,
this conceptual confusion compounds the problem of a lack of leadership in this area,
which hinders the eﬀectiveness of EU conﬂict prevention. More generally, the EU
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continues to prioritize early preventive action over response, which constitutes an obstacle
to bridging the early warning-early response gap.
Challenge 2: ensuring cooperation with other international partners
Problems relating to the eﬀective response to conﬂict are not exclusive to the EU. Since the end
of the Cold War, conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding have risen to prominence on the
agendas of governments and international organizations (OECD, 2012; OSCE, 2011; UN,
1992, 2004). These actors have been faced with similar problems regarding achieving a com-
prehensive approach and/or promoting local ownership (see NATO, 2010; UN, 2000).
However, despite the existence of common problems, there are relatively few studies compar-
ing the practice of diﬀerent international organizations in peacebuilding. This Forum assesses
the eﬀorts of the EU, theUnitedNations (UN), theOrganisation for Security andCooperation
in Europe (OSCE), and NATO in conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding (see Dijkstra, Mahr,
Petrov,Đokić, & Zartsdahl, Forthcoming; Faleg, Forthcoming). More speciﬁcally, the Forum
examines a key challenge that aﬀects most international actors operating in this area, that of
inter-organisational coherence. In what constitutes a very crowded environment, diﬀerent
actors have diﬀerent institutional rationales, mandates, procedures and resources making
coordination diﬃcult. While many eﬀorts (and resources) have been aimed at creating and
exploiting synergies between diﬀerent activities and actors in a peacebuilding context as
part of a “comprehensive” or “integrated” approach, problems remain.2
The need to ensure cooperation with a wide range of international partners has been
well-recognised by the EU (see Commission and HR, 2013; European Union, 2016).
The European Security Strategy placed a lot of emphasis on the need to pursue
“eﬀective multilateralism” (Council of the EU, 2003). The EUGS calls speciﬁcally for
the need to “pursue a multi-lateral approach engaging all those players present in a
conﬂict and necessary for its resolution” (European Union, 2016, p. 29). The EU has
sought to strengthen its partnerships with key international organizations involved in
peacebuilding, including the UN, the OSCE and NATO. While a number of joint initiat-
ives have aimed at improving communication and coordination, including a recent EU-
NATO Declaration (NATO and EU, 2016), synergies have not always been forthcoming,
particularly on the ground. It is still not clear whether the renewed impetus with the EUGS
and a new “integrated approach” to external conﬂicts and crises will change things on the
ground (EEAS and Commission, 2017).
This Forum examines some of these issues in relation to the implementation of the EU’s
external action in diﬀerent contexts (Caucasus, Western Balkans, Sahel) and between
diﬀerent partners (UN, OSCE, NATO). For instance, key questions that the contributions
investigate include: how can the EU learn from others to achieve a more integrated and
comprehensive approach to international conﬂicts and crises? how can the EU improve
coordination with other international actors? How can the EU enhance complementarities
and synergies with others working in conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding?
In his article, Faleg (Forthcoming) looks at what can be learned from the EU, UN and
NATO’s implementation of a comprehensive approach and what the comparative advantage
of the EU is in this regard. The analysis shows that the EU and the UN display the most
comprehensive approach to dealing with conﬂict and crises, with NATO and the OSCE
remaining more focused and less strategically driven in their initiatives. The article also
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shows that the EU’s eﬀorts to achieve a more integrated approach as set out in the EUGS
(European Union, 2016) will not be suﬃcient to take a “whole-of-EU” strategy to the
next level. In order to achieve this, the EU should continue to foster complementarity
and synergies with other actors, especially with the UN, NATO and the OSCE, who have
invested in integrated frameworks for managing risks and responding to conﬂict.
Following from this point, Dijkstra et al. (Forthcoming) provide an in-depth analysis of
complementarities and synergies among the EU, UN and OSCE. Firstly, a comparative
analysis of deployments and mandates show that the role of these organizations remains
in principle largely complementary. However, an investigation of interactions on the
ground in the cases of Armenia, Kosovo and Mali shows a diﬀerent picture. Despite rela-
tively few conﬂicts between these organizations, Dijkstra et al. (Forthcoming) ﬁnd that these
organizations continue to work in parallel, focusing on their narrow mandates and compe-
tences. By contrast, more permanent exchanges and synergies have proved challenging.
Challenge 3: fostering synergies between civilian and military instruments
While the previous discussion pointed at the need to achieve a multi-lateral and sequential
integration of diﬀerent activities, the need to integrate and better coordinate the work
between civilian and military actors and capabilities has also been recognized. Civil–mili-
tary coordination has proven particularly diﬃcult in conﬂict areas. The phenomenon of
“new wars” (Kaldor, 1999) has led to an increasing consensus among policy-makers
and academics on the need to address security threats by a mixture of civilian and military
instruments. The concept of the integrated approach also seeks to integrate the broad
range of civilian and military instruments at the disposal of international actors into a hol-
istic and coherent approach (Zelizer, 2013). This trend has been reinforced by the
increased blurring of boundaries between internal and external security (see Tardy, 2017).
In the case of the EU, the need for a more integrated approach between civilian and
military instruments has been acknowledged both at the political and operational levels
(Council of the EU, 2009). As a result, the EU developed the concepts of civil–military
cooperation (CIMIC) and civil–military coordination (CMCO) in the context of the
CSDP (Juncos, 2007) and the broader concept of the comprehensive approach, which
includes other non-CSDP activities, instruments and actors (Commission and HR,
2013, p. 3). This approach, which was ﬁrst pilot tested in the EU’s engagement in the
Western Balkans, has since been operationalized in other regions – see, for instance, the
Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (Council of the EU, 2011). With the introduc-
tion of the integrated approach by the EUGS, the EU has sought to take EU crisis response
to the next level by expanding its reach to include a multilevel, multilateral, multiphase
and multidimensional dimensions (Faleg, Forthcoming).
However, questions remain regarding the coordination of civil and military actors and
capabilities. In particular, how can civil–military synergies within CSDP be improved?
What is best practice in civil–military coordination? How can we strengthen synergies
between civilian and military instruments and actors on the ground? The article by Zarts-
dahl (Forthcoming) seeks to address some of these questions by drawing on the cases of
CSDP operations and missions in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. Noting
that much of the current literature has focused on the strategic and planning levels, Zarts-
dahl develops a conceptual framework for deﬁning and analysing civil–military synergies
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at the operational level. The article concludes that the stove-piped nature of the EU’s
command structure hampers coordination eﬀorts between civilian and military actors
to the extent that synergies are more common with non-EU partners (e.g. UN, NATO)
than between EU actors (CSDP missions and operations and other EU actors).
Challenge 4: ensuring local ownership and the sustainability of reforms
Finally, another key challenge identiﬁed in the literature refers to the need to fully integrate
aﬀected communities in conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding. The ﬁndings in the litera-
ture suggest that where communities have been meaningfully involved, conﬂict prevention
and peacebuilding are seen as more legitimate by local actors and tend to yield better and
more sustainable results than those that have been imposed by external actors. As a result,
“local ownership” has become a prerequisite for conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding
activities which is in line with the objective of supporting human security, which promotes
security and peace for the people, rather than the state. The EU has acknowledged the need
to incorporate local perspectives in several policy documents, including its new Security
Sector Reform Strategy (Commission and HR, 2016) and the EUGS (European Union,
2016). The latter, in particular, emphasizes the need to increase the involvement of the
host governments and societies by promoting local ownership, and building the resilience
and capacities of the EU’s neighbouring countries.
Yet, despite local ownership becoming commonplace in policy discourse, there remain
inconsistencies and problems in the way it is approached (Ejdus & Juncos, 2018). A case in
point is the EU’s engagement with civil society. The EU has co-operated with civil society
in a variety of ways on the prevention of conﬂict, inter alia: providing funding for civil society’s
conﬂict prevention activities; sharing information and analysis; and working in alliance with
civil society to inﬂuence peace processes at diﬀerent levels. There has been an attempt by the
Commission to make this more systematic by developing roadmaps for the engagement with
civil society at the country level (European Commission, 2012). Other institutions, such as the
Council, and EU instruments, such as CSDPmissions, are also slowly changing their approach
and attitude towards civil society. Yet, there are still problems related to limited public partici-
pation, weak local ownership practices, and regarding issues of participation and protection of
women in conﬂict areas (Babaud, Giarmana, Parker, & Rynn, 2009).
The contribution by Edmunds, Juncos, and Algar-Faria (Forthcoming) provides further
evidence of the struggles faced by the EU and other international actors when it comes to
ensuring local ownership in capacity building activities. In part, the trials and tribulations
of the EU, and other international actors, are due to the complex political contexts in
which these institutions are parachuted, and uncertainties regarding whether the notion
of the “local” captures the diversity of the communities in which capacity building takes
place; or else what the outcome to be “owned” at the end of this process is or should be.
This, in turn, has led to a “legitimacy deﬁcit” for EU programmes in the Horn of Africa and
the Western Balkans, which have had little involvement from local stakeholders and
knowledge, and whose goals have often been at odds with local preferences and priorities.
Looking back, moving forward
The articles in this Forum provide evidence of the increasing maturity of the EU as a
conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding actor. This evolution has been closely accompanied
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by the development of various learning mechanisms in order to help improve the EU’s
performance. Michael Smith’s contribution thus focuses on the learning culture underpin-
ning the EU’s civilian conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding activities (Smith, Forthcom-
ing). Drawing on the ﬁndings from this Forum and from an extensive online catalogue of
lessons identiﬁed produced by the EU-CIVCAP project (EU-CIVCAP, 2018), Smith sum-
marizes some key ﬁndings regarding the EU’s role in conﬂict prevention and peacebuild-
ing. As a whole, he argues, there is evidence that the EU has developed a complex learning
culture and that certain lessons have improved the conduct of peacebuilding tasks by the
EU and its partners. Yet, the EU’s eﬀorts in civilian conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding
activities have not been as eﬀective as they could have been, and there are still problems
relating to the EU’s learning system, including the fact that the EU does not always follow
its own learning procedures (Smith, Forthcoming).
Reﬂecting on some of the issues identiﬁed earlier on in this Introduction, one of the key
challenges when it comes to the implementation of lessons learned relates to the complex-
ity of the EU as an international actor, as well as the complex nature of international
conﬂicts. Hence, the challenge of coordinating between civilian and military actors also
extends to the learning domain, with each of these actors having their own learning cul-
tures. Similarly, learning from others (e.g. UN, NATO, OSCE) has also been inhibited by
the multiplicity of learning mechanisms and approaches among these organizations. Not
surprisingly, this also compounds the challenge of developing complementarities and
synergies among key international actors (see also Dijkstra et al. Forthcoming; Faleg,
Forthcoming). Smith (Forthcoming) also points to the “mission approach”, problems of
recruitment, and the high turnover of staﬀ in CSDP operations as additional factors hin-
dering learning processes as it prevents “deep learning” among those involved in EU
peacebuilding initiatives. In sum, as a mechanism for institutional reform, learning can
play but a limited role in fulﬁlling the ambitions set out in the EU Global Strategy.
Looking ahead, and despite considerable progress in recent years, there remain con-
siderable challenges for the EU as a conﬂict prevention and peacebuilding actor. This
Forum identiﬁes four such challenges relating to the need to close the gap between
early warning and early response, better coordination with other international peacebuild-
ing actors, enhancing synergies between civilian and military actors and, last but not least,
ensuring that reforms are locally owned and sustainable. Lessons learned from past fail-
ures and from others can contribute to addressing some of these challenges through insti-
tutional reform and the improvement of the EU’s civilian capabilities. However, renewed
commitment at the EU and international level on preventative action and sustaining peace
requires the political will – backed by the necessary capabilities – from the member states
to ensure that the EU acts as a coherent, comprehensive and strategic actor. Current devel-
opments on a Civilian CSDP Compact are a promising start; but only sustained political
commitment over the medium and long term can help address some of the key challenges
the EU and other international actors face in promoting sustainable peace.
Notes
1. In this article, conﬂict prevention can be deﬁned as any attempt aimed at reducing tensions
and stopping the escalation or outbreak of violent conﬂict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, &
Miall, 2011, pp. 123–145). For its part, peacebuilding is understood as a range of activities
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aiming to address the roots of conﬂict and promote sustainable peace in the medium and the
long term (see Paris & Sisk, 2009).
2. For a discussion of the concepts “comprehensive” and “integrated” approach, please see Faleg
(Forthcoming).
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